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Abstract—While social engineering represents a real and 
ominous threat to many organizations, companies, governments, 
and individuals, social networking sites (SNSs), have been 
identified as among the most common means of social 
engineering attacks. Owing to factors that reduce the ability of 
users to detect social engineering tricks and increase the ability of 
attackers to launch them, SNSs seem to be perfect breeding 
ground for exploiting the vulnerabilities of people, and the 
weakest link in security. This work will contribute to the 
knowledge of social engineering by identifying different entities 
and subentities that affect social engineering based attacks in 
SNSs. Moreover, this paper includes an intensive and 
comprehensive overview of different aspects of social engineering 
threats in SNSs. 
Keywords— Social engineering, Social networking sites, 
Information security, Privacy, Trust. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Threats in information security generally come through the 
vulnerabilities of technologies or the vulnerabilities of people. 
However, while technology-based threats are well discussed, 
and addressed in many studies, human-based threats seem to be 
less attractive to researchers in the information technology 
field, perhaps because of the complexity of understanding and 
predicting the human behaviors that lead to human 
vulnerabilities. Social engineering is the type of security attack 
that exploits those vulnerabilities to meet the desires of the 
attacker [1]. It has been found that social engineering attacks 
pose the most significant security risks; they are more 
challenging to control [2, 3]. Currently, cyber attacks have 
more to do with manipulating humans than ever [4]. 
Since the first recognizable appearance of social 
networking sites (SNSs) in 1997, with the social networking 
site SixDegrees.com [5], people have been attracted to those 
sites to construct their profiles and communicate with each 
other in different ways depending on the nature of the site. 
SNSs also have been implementing a wide variety of technical 
features that enable people, companies, organizations, or 
governmental institutions to do a variety of services [5]. As the 
numbers of users of SNSs have been increasing dramatically, 
the amount of sensitive and private information of people, 
companies, organizations, or governmental institutions and 
their activities is also increasing dramatically. This not only 
makes SNSs attractive to faithful users but also makes them 
perfect breeding grounds for malicious users and attackers. 
Information is always under threat, and it can be intercepted, 
modified, or exposed. The facilities that are setup to monitor 
such attacks are also constantly under attack [6]. Such attacks 
shape the challenges of providing usability and sociability, 
which are the main purposes of SNSs, as well as ensuring 
integrity, confidentiality, and availability, which are standard 
principles of security. 
The aim of this paper is to present a comprehensive picture 
of social engineering threats in SNSs. This aim can be achieved 
by answering two main questions concerning these threats: 
1. What entities and subentities affect social engineering 
in SNSs? 
2. How do those entities and subentities affect social 
engineering in SNSs? 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section II, the motivation to study social engineering in SNSs 
is explained. In Section III to VII, a comprehensive overview 
of entities and subentities that affect social engineering threats 
in SNSs is presented. And finally, the study concludes with 
Section VIII. 
II. MOTIVATION 
The Institute of Management and Administration (IOMA) 
reported social engineering as the top security threat for 2005. 
They indicate that social engineering threats, which are human-
based, are on the rise owing to continued improvements in 
protections against technology-based threats [7]. According to 
a survey done by Dimension Research (2011) on 850 IT and 
security professionals located in the United States, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, and New Zealand, 48% 
of participants had been victims of social engineering and had 
experienced 25 or more attacks in 2010 and 2011. Social 
engineering attacks cost victims an average of $25,000 to 
$100,000 per security incident, the report states. Of the 
participants, 39% believe that the SNSs are the most common 
source of social engineering threats, and only 26% of the 
participants in that survey actively train employees on social 
engineering threats [8]. Although many organizations 
recognize the importance of controlling security threats, many 
fail to recognize the dangers of social engineering attacks [9]. 
A study that included more than 4,000 users of Facebook 
found that most participants are willing to provide large 
amounts of personal information in SNSs, thus exposing 
themselves to various physical and cyber risks [10]. Now, the 
use of SNSs as the main tool of social interaction results in a 
loss of privacy [11]. This therefore opens users and their 
originations or networks to becoming targets of major security 
threats [12]. 
Through providing an introduction to security issues in the 
area of SNSs, and highlighting some threats in SNSs, the 
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) 
indicates that SNSs can be dangerous weapons in the hands of 
spammers, unscrupulous marketers, and social engineers who 
may take criminal advantage of users [13]. Nagy and Pecho 
(2009) have analyzed and validated the possibilities of 
misusing SNSs due to irresponsible behavior of users [14]. In 
addition, the baseline success rate for using information 
obtained from SNSs in phishing attacks has been established 
[15]. Because of the lack of users’ awareness, social 
engineering is considered a low-cost and effective form of 
attack [16]. Moreover, some researchers have started 
investigating in automating social engineering, hijacking, and 
phishing in social networking sites [17, 18]. 
The risk of social engineering in SNSs is expected to 
increase in the future because of the fact that the information 
that users provide about themselves are the most valuable 
elements to the social networking site providers. Therefore, 
SNSs’ providers will keep encouraging users to reveal and 
share more personal information. Researchers have given 
examples of some of the tactics that are used by the providers 
of SNSs to persuade users to share their personal information 
[19, 20]. Providers of SNSs use such information in marketing 
and advertisements in which they select specific groups of 
users, based on their specifications, to receive specific product 
advertisements; therefore, we expect there to be an increase in 
social engineering exploits in the future, unless effective 
countermeasures are deployed. SNSs are also expected to 
continue being the perfect place for social engineers to launch 
their attacks owing to other characteristics, such as easy and 
free joining and the variety of content that social engineers can 
make and use, such as news, stories, hyperlinks, photos, 
videos, and applications, which can be employed in many 
different attacks [21]. 
III. COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW OF ENTITIES AND 
SUBENTITIES THAT AFFECT SOCIAL ENGINEERING THREATS IN 
SNSS 
There are different entities involved in social engineering in 
SNSs, and each entity affects it in a specific way. At the same 
time, each entity is affected by other subentities. One aspect of 
the complexity of understanding and controlling social 
engineering threats relates to the fact that social engineering 
involves different area of studies, such as cultural beliefs, 
information technology, sociology, and psychology. 
In this paper, we attempted to cover all of those areas and 
present them in one conceptual model (Figure 1). This model 
identifies all of those entities and subentities that affect social 
engineering in SNSs, with the main entities being: social 
networking sites (the environment), the social engineer (the 
attacker), plan and technique (the trick), and SNS users (the 
victims). An explanation of how these entities affect (as well as 
how they are affected by) other subentities will be presented in 
the following sections. 
IV. SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES (ENVIRONMENT) 
Social networking sites affect the success of social 
engineering attacks in two main ways: the first way involves 
information gathering about the victims in order to understand 
their vulnerabilities. This is an important step in order to 
choose a perfect tactic and develop a good plan [22]. The 
information that will be gathered can be any available personal 
or organizational information, such as name, age, work, 
position, interests, hobbies, address, banks the victims deals 
with, friends the victim trusts, or even the car a victim dreams 
to have. Some of the information available might not be useful 
by its own; however, it can be used by a social engineer to gain 
more information that is valuable [23]. 
The second way involves reaching the victim. That is, 
SNSs are not only useful for information gathering; they also 
offer cheap and effective means of reaching victims and 
applying effective tricks [24]. Whether SNSs were used in 
information gathering or in reaching the victims and lunching 
the attack, there are three main sources that can be used [25]. 
Those sources and their roles will be described in the following 
subsections. 
A. Privacy Setting 
Most SNSs classify users in relation to others, as a “friend,” 
“friend of friend,” or “unfriend” (public users). Some of them 
also allow users to divide their friends into different groups; 
each group has different privacy setting. However, by 
recognizing SNSs, we can see that a large percentage of users’ 
profiles are set to be shown publicly to any users in the social 
networking site, or even to any user from outside that site who 
uses any web search engine, such as Google or Yahoo!. 
Research indicates that the profile details of more than 100 
million Facebook users were publicly accessible through 
search engines [10]. Other profiles are set to be shown to 
friend-of-friend users, or to all friends. The risk associated with 
making those profiles accessible or shown to others is high, 
and it is more dangerous for those who make their profiles 
shown publicly, than those who are open to friend-of-friend 
users or to all friends. 
 Users who own public profiles either set their profiles to be 
accessible publicly intentionally for different reasons, or 
because they did not change the default privacy setting of their 
profiles [10]. The users of SNSs are also highly willing to 
reveal private or personal information on their profiles [10]. 
This information includes their names, birthdays, work, 
locations, telephone numbers, addresses, e-mail addresses, real 
photos, and many others critical information. Users, with the 
information they reveal online, expose themselves to social 
engineers who can use this information to launch various 
physical and cyber attacks. Their home addresses and e-mail 
addresses, for example, can be used in phishing [15]. Photos, 
names, birthdays, and addresses can be valuable information 
for pretexting, identity theft, impersonation, and other kinds of 
threats [26]. 
 B. Friendship and Connection 
People have some psychological motives, such as 
entertainment or meeting new people, that can encourage them 
to talk with strangers over the Internet [27, 28]. Social 
engineers can use the psychological trick of starting a 
“friendship” with the victims in order to build trust between the 
attacker and the victims, and then abuse this trust to launch an 
attack. This type of attack could be to gain critical information 
from the victim or to get the victim to perform an action that 
benefits the attacker and hurts the victim or his/her 
organization [29].  
Most SNSs allow any user to choose the name, photo, age, 
school, and other personal information freely. This makes it 
easy for the social engineer to impersonate any identity in order 
to gain trust from the victim. When the victim accepts the 
friendship invitation, the social engineer can establish a direct 
connection, engage in small talk, or act as if he/she has the 
same interests, problems, or experiences of the victim [11]. 
Moreover, being in a “friend list” of a victim, allows the social 
engineer to spy on posts or activities that the victim makes. 
Moreover, some social networking sites automatically 
recommend new friends for the users depending on some 
common elements, such as friends, schools, or groups in 
common. This feature can lead to another important other 
technique of social engineering called reverse attack. In this 
attack, the social engineer connects to the victim’s friends first, 
so that the victim gets tricked into contacting the social 
engineer him/herself [30]. 
Social engineers can also use specialized spamming 
software such as FriendBot, to automate sending friendship 
invitations [13]. Another example of such software is 
“Facebook blaster,” which can be used to collect a huge 
number of users’ IDs and send huge amounts of friend requests 
and messages to users [31]. This is a very dangerous tool 
because it can select specific groups of users based on specific 
criteria to launch a specific attack. That is, it is possible for the 
attacker to target specific organization’s employees with 
specific attacks, such as phishing, viruses, or malware, and the 
success probability of such attacks is high. 
C. Content 
Content is all available information in users’ profiles and 
different pages or groups, such as news stories, blog, tags, 
posts, notes, videos, photos, hyperlinks, and so on. Users of 
Facebook, for example, share more than 30 billion pieces of 
content each month [21]. Insecure dealing with the content 
 
Fig. 1, Entities and Subentities that Affect Social Engineering Threats in SNSs 
available on the SNSs leads people to fall victim to many 
social engineering threats. The content may have malicious 
software such as viruses and worms. This can be embedded in 
the posts or messages through a hyperlink that leads to an 
executable file, for example, or to a hyperlink of a page that 
includes another hyperlink to an executable file with some 
instructions that trick the victim to download that file [13]. 
Phishing is also a potential threat of dealing insecurely with 
content. Phishing can be posted in SNSs as a story, offer, or 
alert message that attract victims to download an attachment or 
click on an embedded hyperlink [32]. Spam is another example 
of such threats, and it is a critical issue, since research suggests 
that SNSs may replace e-mail as a means of communication 
[13]. Moreover, for those SNSs that allow users to post HTML 
in their profiles, users are vulnerable to cross-site scripting 
attacks (XSS), which enable attackers to install client-side 
script into a profile that is viewed by other users [13]. In 
addition, there is “defamation” and “ballot stuffing,” which are 
forms of attack that aim to destroy the reputation of a person or 
system [33].  
V. SOCIAL ENGINEER (ATTACKER) 
The social engineer is the second main entity that affects 
social engineering threats in a social networking site. He/she 
plays a vital role in the success of social engineering, and this 
role can be divided to three main tasks: understanding the 
targeted victim, developing a perfect plan, and launching that 
plan. Therefore, the ability of a social engineer to function in 
any one of these tasks can affect the success of the attack. The 
following subsections will explain each task in more detail. 
A. The Ability to Understand the Victim 
As described earlier, most successful social engineering 
attacks begin with information gathering about the victim. This 
helps the attacker to discover the weak points of the victim as 
well as prepare some information to help the attacker gain a 
certain amount of trust. The attacker can then abuse this trust to 
trick the victim into saying “yes” to the trick. 
B. The Ability to Develop a Plan  
Determining the tactics and developing a plan depend on 
the information gathered about the victim and the goals that the 
social engineers want to achieve. According to Information 
Manipulation Theory, a speaker purposefully and covertly 
violates one of the conversational maxims of quantity, quality, 
relation, and manner with the intention of deceiving his/her 
listener [34]. The social engineer will determine which tactic 
would be most suitable and successful for tricking the victim. 
This task also involves developing a good plan to reach that 
goal, which can include “pretexting,” in which a social 
engineer creates a setting designed to persuade the victim to 
fall for the trick [35]. It also involves determining which steps 
and phases should be taken to reach the goal, and determining 
the best time to launch each step. Time pressure, for example, 
can affect the decisions that people make. It affects the logical 
functioning of human judgment, and therefore, the victim is 
more willing to accept arguments that should be challenged 
[36, 37]. In SNSs, a social engineer can watch the victims’ 
activities, posts, comments, and mode statuses to find the 
perfect moment to launch the attack or apply the planned trick. 
C. The Ability to Perform the Plan 
The social engineer uses professional skills to apply the 
plan. These involve performing a good scenario and dialogue 
with the victim, and avoiding any mistakes that can help the 
victim to discover the deception [1]. The scenario and dialogue 
in the SNS can involve interaction with the victim through 
chatting, for example, or it can be through the content of the 
pages, profiles, and walls, such as posts, tags, and comments. 
The professional skills of the social engineer include tact, 
persuasion, flattery, or lobbying, depending on the situation of 
the victim and the type of trick. 
According to Source Credibility Theory, people are more 
likely to be persuaded when the source presents itself as 
credible [38]. Therefore, social engineer ability to launch the 
plan involves wearing a suitable “hat” and playing a suitable 
character, and the social engineer must choose a specific 
character to play [25]. This character can be a very poor 
person, a sexy girl, or a wonderful friend. A social engineer can 
also impersonate a real, well-known person to the victim, such 
as a friend, boss, relative, or even a famous person [39]. This 
task is much easier in social networking sites where users can 
create multiple fake profiles and choose their names, photos, 
locations, and other details easily. At the same time, it is more 
difficult for the victim to uncover the deception through a 
social networking site than in a face-to-face, real-life situation. 
The social engineer, depending on the victim’s vulnerabilities, 
can use distance, anonymity, and absence of authentication 
mechanisms to abuse a victim [40]. A suitable “hat” shapes the 
character that the social engineer plays in order to make the 
victim feel trust and safety, and therefore, encourage the victim 
to accept the trick. 
VI. PLAN AND TECHNIQUE (TRICK) 
The tactic and the plan are strongly tied and affected by 
each other, and the techniques used can include phishing, 
persuasion and bribery, or reverse attacks. The plan is the 
preparation that makes that technique transpire successfully, 
including time, resources, and steps to be followed. The plan 
and technique chosen play vital roles in determining the 
success of the social engineering attack. They are affected by 
two main subentities: the quality of the plan and technique, and 
the suitability of that plan and technique to the targeted victim. 
According to Elaboration Likelihood Model, there are two 
routes or methods to influence others: the central route and the 
peripheral route [41]. The central route uses message 
elaboration and can produce a positive attitude change and 
encourage the receiver to obey. Centrally routed messages 
include a wealth of information, rational arguments, and 
evidence to support a particular conclusion. This affect will be 
described in more details through the following subsections: 
A. The Quality of the Plan and Technique 
 Depending on the information gathered about the victim 
and the goals the social engineers want to achieve, the social 
engineer will determine which tactic would be most suitable 
and successful to trick the victim, what time is best to launch 
the attack, and which steps should be taken to trick the victim 
into falling for the attack. Generally, there are many commonly 
used techniques in social engineering [25]. Those techniques 
include but are not limited to the following: 
 “Phishing,” which is enticing a victim to download an 
attachment or to click on an embedded hyperlink [42]. 
This technique can be used to gather privacy information; 
manipulate users to type or provide critical information, 
such as their usernames and passwords [32]; or installing 
malicious backdoor programs that allow the attacker full 
access to the system [43]. Phishing attacks accounted for 
more than a quarter of all reported computer crimes in 
2007 [44]. SNSs can be used to gather information such 
as e-mail addresses, or any information that helps to trick 
the user to fall victim to phishing. Moreover, SNSs can be 
used easily and effectively to attract victims to respond to 
phishing. 
 “Persuasion and bribery,” which is attempting to persuade 
an employee to do an action even if this action bypasses 
company rules. There are multiple means of persuasion, 
and one of them is giving a bribe to an employee [44].  
 “Shoulder surfing,” This technique involves looking over 
an unsuspecting user’s shoulder while the user is entering 
his/her user name and password or while he/she is doing 
his/her work. This is a kind of spying to gain valuable 
information [44]. This can be done in SNSs easily by 
spying over the activities, posts, tags, or comments that 
are made by the users.  
 “Spam,” which involves sending messages to various 
people to ask for certain personal information, to get them 
to buy or sell products and services, or to ask them to 
participate or donate for charitable works [32]. 
 “Dumpster diving,” which is looking for valuable 
information in a company dumpster to find a phone 
directory, for example [44]. This can be done in SNSs, 
through diving into users’ profiles, groups, events, and 
pages to look for any valuable information that can help 
directly or indirectly.  
 “Reverse attack,” in which the attacker does not establish 
contact with the victim. Rather, the social engineer tricks 
victims into contacting him/her. In this case, the victim 
will be extremely trusting of the attacker, and the attacker 
will take the chance to ask the victim to give up any 
information or to do any action [30].  
B. The Suitability to the Targeted Victim 
People are very different in their reactions and behaviors, 
and their weak points and vulnerabilities are also very 
different. These differences are a result of different personality 
types, interests, needs, and demographic variables such as age, 
gender, and educational level. According to Social Judgment 
Theory, people evaluate and judge the content of any message 
based on their anchors, or stance, on a particular topic or 
message. That is, people accept the message or reject it based 
on their cognitive map [45]. Choosing suitable tricks or 
techniques for a specific victim is crucial. In Section VII (SNS 
user), this subject is presented in more detail. 
VII. SNS USER (VICTIM) 
The forth main entity that affects the success of social 
engineering attacks in SNSs is the user or the victim. The 
victim is always human. Even if the attacker is targeting the 
organization that the victim works for, the human is the entity 
that will deal directly with the trick. In the following 
subsections, we will present what previous research has 
suggested in psychology, sociology, information security or 
behavioralism regarding human susceptibility to fall victim to 
social engineering attacks. 
A. The Socio-Psychological Factors 
People, in general, think that they are good at detecting 
deceptions and lies. However, research indicates that people 
have specific weaknesses and therefore perform poorly in 
detecting social engineering attacks [46, 47]. On the 
organizational level, the findings of a study done by Kvedar et 
al. (2010) suggest that social engineers could succeed even 
among those organizations that identify themselves as being 
aware of social engineering techniques [48]. Marett, Biros, and 
Knode (2004) have explained that the reason why people are 
weak and perform poorly in detecting deception is because of 
the “lie detector bias,” which is the assumption that most 
people are telling the truth [49]. Most books and studies that 
have been published regarding social engineering indicate that 
the main causes of human weaknesses, leading people to fall 
victim to social engineers, are human socio-psychological 
characteristics [3, 32, 50, 51]. Human socio-psychological 
factors that influence users to behave in a certain way (e.g., 
liking, reciprocity, scarcity, social proof, fear, and strong 
affect) have been studied in marketing in order to persuade 
customers to buy certain products [52]. Socio-psychological 
factors can be affected by personality types, demographics 
variables, and motivations and drives. 
B. Personality Type and User Demographics 
Previous research has indicated that there is a relationship 
between socio-psychological factors, personality type, and 
demographics variables such as age, gender, and educational 
level. There are a few studies that have measured susceptibility 
to specific types of phishing attacks (one type of social 
engineering attack) or have studied the effectiveness of one or 
more phishing countermeasures in relation to some user 
demographics. Darwish, Zarka, and Aloul (2012) presented a 
review survey of recent studies, as shown in Table 1. Their aim 
was to understand the relationship between the victims’ 
backgrounds and phishing attacks. They found that user 
demographics and personality traits are valuable factors for 
social engineering studies and other social security research 
[53]. 
C. Motivations and Drives 
People are affected by their motivations and drives, and as 
described earlier, social engineers abuse human characteristics 
to trick victims. Human motivations are among those 
characteristics that need to be understood to predict human 
behaviors, and therefore help to control social engineering 
threats. By reviewing existing literature we can categorize 
human behaviors, from a social engineering point of view, into 
two categories: need-based behaviors and emotion-based 
behaviors. The attacker can use either human needs or 
emotions to encourage the user to accept the trick and fall 
victim to the attack. For example, the attacker can use the 
sexual desires of the victim and send him/her malicious 
software imbedded in a sexual video. The attacker could also 
use the greed of a victim and send him/her malicious software 
imbedded in a free e-book. Additionally, an attacker can use 
emotions, such as a strong sense of surprise, anticipation, or 
anger, to make victims fall for the trick. More details of both; 
the need-based behaviors and emotion-based behaviors will be 
presented in the following sections. 
TABLE 1, CHARACTERISTICS OF POTENTIAL PHISHING VICTIMS 
 
1) Need-Based Behaviors 
Many studies have investigated how human needs motivate 
and shape human behaviors. Depending on the need, a specific 
motivation will arise and drive the person to behave in a certain 
manner. Several theories have been developed to illustrate this 
relationship. The major theories of motivation are: 
a) Incentive Theory of Motivation 
According to instinct theories, people behave in a certain 
way in order to gain an external reward [54]. For example, 
people may travel from place to place to find enough water or 
food, or work twelve hours per day to increase their income. 
b) Drive Reduction Theory of Motivation 
This theory was created by Clark Hull, and it suggests that 
the reduction of drives is the primary force behind motivation 
[55]. That is, people are motivated to behave in a certain way 
in order to reduce the internal tension that is caused by 
biological needs. Hull indicates that these needs represent the 
drives of the internal states of tension which must be reduced, 
such as thirst, hunger, or the need for warmth. 
c) Humanistic Theory of Motivation 
This is the most important theory for illustrating human 
motivations. It was developed by Abraham Maslow and 
suggests that people have strong cognitive reasons for 
performing various actions. Maslow tried to classify different 
motivations at different levels by introducing his hierarchy of 
needs . He indicated that all motivations are driven by human 
needs, and each level in this hierarchy has more motivational 
priority that the next level [56]. These levels of needs are 
physiological needs, safety and security needs, social needs, 
self esteem needs, and self-actualization needs. 
2) Emotion-Based Behaviors 
The second category of human behaviors is the emotion-
based, or the behaviors that are driven by emotion. A strong 
affect is one example of emotion, and social engineers can use 
this as a “trigger” to deceive their victims [57]. The strong 
sense of surprise, anticipation, or anger leads victims to make 
inaccurate judgments and therefore victims will be less likely 
to think about their actions [57]. Emotion has been investigated 
since the early nineties as a vital drive for human behaviors. 
Waston, in his "Psychology from the Standpoint of a 
Behaviorist," defined emotion as “an heredity pattern-reaction 
involving profound changes of the bodily mechanism as a 
whole, but particularly of the visceral and glandular systems” 
[58]. Tolman (1923) defined emotion as the readiness or drive 
for any behavior [59]. Emotion has been defined by Arnold 
(1960) as “the felt tendency toward anything intuitively 
appraised as good (beneficial), or away from anything 
intuitively appraised as bad (harmful)” [60]. Several theories 
have been developed to illustrate the relationships between 
emotions and behaviors. The major theories of emotion are: 
a) James-Lange Theory 
This theory suggests that an event causes a bodily response, 
and that the bodily response causes the emotion [61]. For 
example, if someone sees a scary snake nearby, his heart will 
begin to race. The brain will then notice the heart racing and 
determine that the person is experiencing fear. 
b) Cannon-Bard Theory 
This theory was developed by Walter Cannon and Philip 
Bard. They disagree with the James-Lange theory and suggest 
that the experience of the emotion and the bodily response 
occur at the same time, independently of each other [62]. For 
example, a racing heart can mean fear, but it can also mean 
excitation in a positive way. Therefore, they believe that the 
emotions are accrued independently from the response of the 
body. 
c) Schachter-Singer Theory 
This theory suggests that emotion requires a bodily 
response, and at the same time, needs an explanation of the 
cause of that bodily response [63]. That is, when an event 
occurs the bodily reaction will follow, and at the same time the 
brain (depending on that situation) will determine why this 
specific bodily reaction occurred. For example, when the heart 
races, the brain notices this and at the same time observes the 
event, therefore explaining why the heart is racing and 
determining an emotion. 
D. Countermeasures 
There are currently a few commonly suggested 
countermeasures for defending against social engineering 
attacks. These countermeasures can enhance the awareness of 
potential victims and provide some controls for their behavior. 
These countermeasures are: 
1) Education and Training 
 This involves developing security awareness and training 
programs to train employees in ways to resist social 
engineering [9]. It must also include regular reminders of the 
necessity of security consciousness [3]. 
2) Policy and Management 
 This involves developing clear and concise security 
protocols that are enforced consistently throughout the 
organization, as well as developing simple rules defining what 
information is sensitive. This also requires the requestors 
identity when restricted actions are requested, and develops a 
data classification policy [48, 57]. 
3) Auditing and Testing 
 This involves testing employees’ susceptibility to social 
engineering attacks [1]. The aim of this countermeasure is to 
make sure that employees are aware of the threat, and to 
discover what vulnerabilities exist. 
E. Risk Belief 
Every person has a specific belief about the risk associated 
with any behavior he/she exhibits. This belief can be different 
from person to person, even with regard to the same action. 
Rosenstock (1974)  introduced a relationship between behavior 
and threat through the health belief model (HBM) [64]. This 
theory suggests that the probability of performing a risky action 
is determined by the perceived threat of taking that action, 
perceived susceptibility to the threat, perceived severity of the 
threat if it has already happened, and perceived benefits of 
taking that action. Aldoory and Van Dyke (2006) went further, 
stating that the problems of performing a risky action have 
been associated with the HBM and the situational theory of 
publics [65]. The latter suggests that a population can be 
classified depending on the way it behaves, that is, whether it is 
active or passive [66]. The psychological issues concerned with 
this theory include: 1) extent of activity in the behavior, 2) 
familiarization with problems, and 3) knowledge of constraints 
[67].  
Zimbardo (2007), explains that the level of familiarization 
with problems is different in different people; some believe that 
a predicament is more relevant to them, while others are not 
concerned with the same affliction [68]. The extent of activity 
in this behavior varies depending on the feelings a person 
attaches to a predicament and the amount of loss that may be 
incurred in the case that an attack occurs [23]. The knowledge 
of constraints shows the degree to which people consider their 
mannerisms to be restrained by issues that are uncontrollable.  
According to Pyszczynski et al. (1997), when people are 
threatened, they will alter their behavior depending on the 
number of risks they can accommodate. This modification is a 
psychological reaction that is determined by the seriousness of 
an attack and the amount of loss that they think will be incurred 
due to a hazard [69]. Consequently, if the victims did not 
perceive the social engineering threat, the severity of it, or did 
not perceive that they were susceptible to this threat, they will 
feel safe regarding it and they will accept the trick. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
SNSs are among the most common means of social 
engineering attacks, and this paper has explained the risks 
associated with SNSs in terms of social engineering. A 
comprehensive overview of entities and subentities that affect 
social engineering threats in social networking sites was 
presented. It has been explained that the success of social 
engineering attacks in SNSs is affected by the characteristics of 
four main entities: the SNS (the environment), social engineer 
(the attacker), plan and technique (the trick), and the SNS user 
(the victim). The ways in which these entities are affected by 
other subentities have also been described. Through this study, 
researchers can gain a fuller picture of social engineering 
threats in SNSs, and take one of many possible directions for 
further research. 
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